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Abstract
We show that separation in signaling games can be obtained without the single crossing
condition, in a model where the receiver reasons analogically across a pair of states and
can acquire costly information on the sender’s type. Beyond ordinary separation (high
type sends high signal, low type sends low signal) we find that also reverse separation
is sustainable in equilibrium (high type sends low signal, low type sends high signal).
Further, reverse separation in one state is obtained only if ordinary separation occurs
in the other state. Pooling is possible and can go along with ordinary separation in
one state.
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1 Introduction
Separating equilibria have a prominent role in signaling games, both in theory and in appli-
cations (Riley, 2001). Typically, the existence of a separating equilibrium crucially relies on
the single crossing condition: in a two-type two-signal setting, the condition means that the
additional cost of a high signal over a low signal is smaller for high types relatively to low
types.
In this paper we provide a novel set of assumptions under which separation is obtained in
the absence of the single crossing condition. In particular, we show that analogical reasoning
and costly acquisition of information by the receiver allows ordinary separation to arise in
equilibrium. Moreover, under the same assumptions we obtain that also reverse separation
can occur in equilibrium: the high type chooses the low signal, and the low type chooses the
high signal.
Analogical reasoning is a reasonable feature of belief revision whenever a decision-maker
is faced with a large variety of possible alternatives, each of which differs from the others
under many respects. In such cases it may be unfeasible to form specific beliefs conditional
on every informational detail of every possible alternative. Rather, the decision-maker can
feasibly focus on a few dimensions that are relevant for the decision to be made and then form
analogy classes on the basis of such dimensions. As an example, consider purchase decisions:
a consumer may well form a belief on the quality of a specific product by averaging over all
products with the same or similar packaging.
Also, individuals can often exert effort and acquire the information that is relevant for
the decision to be made. Consider again purchase decisions: a consumer can invest time
and cognitive resources to carefully read product information reported on packaging, in the
attempt to acquire a more precise knowledge of the product quality.
Our result that separation can be sustained by analogical reasoning and costly acquisition
of information is important, we think, because the single crossing condition is likely to fail in a
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non-negligible number of cases. Carrying on the example about purchase decisions, we see no
compelling reason why different packaging options should cost relatively more for low quality
sellers than for high quality sellers. Further, the possibility of reverse separation might help
to rationalize situations where low types engage more than high types in signaling activities,
as it may happen when low quality producers make use of fancy packaging to overcome a
careful scrutiny by consumers.
In our model, the receiver can face signals in two different states, and exhibits analogical
reasoning across them. This means that he is able to condition his action on the state he is
actually in, but at the same time he is unable to exploit this information when updating his
belief on the sender’s type; so, the receiver’s decisions are based on the average type that is
believed to send the observed signal. In addition, the receiver can acquire information at a
cost: after observing the signal and prior to taking an action, he can incur a cost to learn
the actual sender’s type.
The main intuition for our results is that separation becomes possible since the receiver’s
act of acquiring information has different consequences for the two types of sender: the
receiver does purchase the good if quality is high, and does not purchase the good if quality
is low. Also, analogical reasoning over distinct states helps prevent that all the information
is revealed in case of separation: acquiring information can be optimal for the receiver even
when separation occurs in one state, provided that a different outcome occurs in the other
state.
Importantly, both analogical reasoning and costly acquisition of information are crucial
for our results. If we remove either of the two assumptions, we lose the possibility of any
kind of separation (ordinary and reverse). To our knowledge, we are the first to explore the
relevance of jointly assuming analogical reasoning and costly acquisition of information.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. In Section 2 we relate our contribution
to the relevant literature. In Section 3 we present the model and we provide a few prelim-
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inary definitions. In Section 4 we provide a motivating application. In Section 5 we define
separation outcomes and we state all our results. Finally, in Section 6 we briefly discuss
pooling outcomes, we summarize our findings and we comment on the crucial role of our
main assumptions.
2 Related Literature
Analogical reasoning has been formally introduced by Jehiel (2005) with the equilibrium
notion called analogy-based expectation equilibrium, and then extended by Jehiel and Koessler
(2008) to games of incomplete information. The analogy-based expectation equilibrium
captures a form of bounded rationality that concerns expectation formation by agents, rather
than best-response selection. This solution concept has been fruitfully applied to explain a
number of phenomena (Ettinger and Jehiel, 2010; Jehiel and Samuelson, 2012; Hagenbach
and Koessler, 2017). Analogical reasoning is related to, but different from, the so-called
coarse reasoning, where agents interpret messages by means of a limited number of categories,
and are unable to distinguish objects falling in the same category (Mullainathan, 2002;
Mullainathan et al., 2008).1
Among the many contributions that consider the acquisition of information as a costly
strategic choice, Dewatripont and Tirole (2005) is particularly relevant since they focus on
a sender-receiver setup, developing a theory of costly communication.2 The cost to acquire
information can be cognitive in nature, stemming from the limited amount of cognitive
resources (Simon, 1955),3 or it can measure the search effort to acquire information on
1A different bound to belief revision is implied by the notion of cursed equilibrium (Eyster and Rabin,
2005). Interestingly, Eyster and Rabin (2005) observe that in a classical signaling game a partially cursed
equilibrium might allow for separation when Nash equilibrium does not.
2Other recent contributions considering the costly acquisition of information are Dewatripont (2006),
Caillaud and Tirole (2007), Tirole (2009) and Butler et al. (2013).
3See also Bilancini and Boncinelli (2016a) for a model of signaling where the costly processing of informa-
4
products’ characteristics, as more typical in models of advertising (see, e.g., Gardete and
Guo, 2014).
The reverse separation that emerges in our model can be related to counter-signaling
(Feltovich et al., 2002): a situation where a sender has a quality that can be mistaken only
for close qualities, and this allows the emergence of a signaling outcome where medium-
quality senders choose high signals to separate from low-quality senders, while high-quality
senders choose low signals to separate from medium-quality senders, thus yielding an inverted
U-shaped relationship between types and signals.4 Reverse separation, instead, produces a
negative monotonic relationship between types and signals.
The only other paper, to our knowledge, where separation does not rely on the single
crossing condition is Daley and Green (2014). Even if they assume single crossing in their
model, their results hold also when the cost of signals is independent of the sender’s type,
as they note in Remark 3.5. Indeed, in their model, in addition to choosing a signal, senders
undergo a test that provides a noisy grade about their actual type. Such a grading mechanism
has different effects on low types and high types, indirectly making the benefits of signaling
type-dependent, and hence allowing separation outcomes.
Finally, while we just assume that the single crossing condition does not hold, we point
out to a recent stream of literature where violations of the single crossing condition are
derived from further sources of agents’ heterogeneity (see Boone and Schottmu¨ller, 2017,
and references therein).
tion is related to dual process theories in psychology, and Bilancini and Boncinelli (2016b) for an application
to persuasion games with labelling. We stress that agents in both these contributions are coarse reasoners,
and not analogical reasoners.
4Harbaugh et al. (2017) and Harbaugh and Rasmusen (2018) explore a similar idea in the setup of
certifiable quality disclosure. Mayzlin and Shin (2011) obtain a counter-signaling equilibrium where medium
quality firms choose to make informative advertising, while high and low quality firms opt for uninformative
advertising, which works as an invitation to search for consumers.
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3 The Model
Consider a Sender-Receiver game with two states, ω1 and ω2. We denote the generic state
with ω ∈ {ω1, ω2}. The common prior of being in ω1 is pω1 .
The Sender, denoted by S, has two types: a high type, denoted by H, and a low type,
denoted by L. We use t ∈ {H,L} to indicate the generic S’s type. The common prior of S
being of type H is potentially different in ω1 and ω2, and is denoted by pH|ω. In each ω, S
sends one of two different signals, denoted by x and y, with generic signal z ∈ {x, y}.
The Receiver, denoted by R, makes decisions after observing the signal sent by S. In
particular, R has to decide on two issues: whether to acquire S’s type t at cost c, and which
action to take. We denote the generic decision to acquire information with i ∈ I = {0, 1},
with 1 indicating acquisition. Also, R chooses between a high action a and a low action a,
where the generic action is denoted by a ∈ {a, a}.
The utility of S is given by V : {H,L} × {ω1, ω2} × {x, y} × {a, a} → R. We assume
that signal x always costs more than signal y, i.e., V (t, ω, x, a) < V (t, ω, y, a), for all t,
ω, and a. Also, we assume that x is always worth to send if it gets a reply of a instead
of a, i.e., V (t, ω, x, a) − V (t, ω, y, a) > 0, for all t and ω. Finally, we assume that no single
crossing condition holds in both ω1 and ω2, i.e., V (H,ω, y, a)−V (H,ω, x, a) = V (L, ω, y, a)−
V (L, ω, x, a), for all ω and a.
The utility of R, gross of acquisition costs, is given by U : {H,L} × {ω1, ω2} × {x, y} ×
{a, a} → R. The cost of acquiring t is denoted by c and is the same in ω1 and ω2. We assume
that, other things being equal, a is the optimal choice when t = H while a is the optimal
choice when t = L. Formally, U(H,ω, z, a) > U(H,ω, z, a) and U(L, ω, z, a) < U(L, ω, z, a)
for all ω and z.
Further, we crucially assume increasing differences in actions and states: U(t, ω2, z, a)−
U(t, ω2, z, a) > U(t, ω1, z, a)−U(t, ω1, z, a) for all t and z. This property amounts to impose
that choosing a over a pays more in ω2 than in ω1.
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A strategy for S is described by a function σ : {H,L} × {ω1, ω2} → {x, y}. To simplify
the exposition, we exploit the fact that, whenever R chooses i = 1, he will then optimally
take a = a if S’s type is L, and a = a if S’s type is H. Hence, we can describe a strategy for
R as a function ρ : {x, y} × {ω1, ω2} → {(0, a), 1, (0, a)}, where (0, a) and (0, a) mean that
information is not acquired (i.e., i = 0) and either action a or action a is taken, respectively,
while 1 means that information is acquired (i.e., i = 1) and then the optimal action is taken
(i.e., a = a if S’s type is L, and a = a if S’s type is H). We restrict attention to pure
strategies, as this turns out to be sufficient for our primary goal of showing what separation
patterns can arise.5
As equilibrium concept, we rely on Jehiel and Koessler (2008), where we find a defini-
tion of analogy-based expectation equilibrium for games of incomplete information. The
distinguishing feature of such equilibrium concept is that players have analogy classes (i.e.,
collections of states of the world possibly different from information sets)6 and they consider
the average behavior of the opponent, and the average prior as well, over states belonging
to the same class.
In our setting, the analogy classes for S are {(H,ω1)}, {(L, ω1)}, {(H,ω2)}, {(L, ω2)},
while for R the only analogy class is {(H,ω1), (L, ω1), (H,ω2), (L, ω2)}. We stress that the
receiver maintains the possibility to condition his action on ω. Here, the states of the world
correspond to the four pairs (H,ω1), (L, ω1), (H,ω2), (L, ω2), but for the ease of exposition
we keep on referring to ω1 and ω2 simply as states.
To simplify the analysis, we define β : {ω1, ω2}×{x, y} → [0, 1] as the function describing
the posterior beliefs held by R after observing a signal and prior to deciding whether to
acquire t. Given the analogy classes of R, we note that β(ω1, z) = β(ω2, z) for all z.
5Considering the mixed extension of the game would add neither to the quality of our findings nor to the
intuition behind them, while it would make proofs and statements substantially longer and less intuitive.
6Information sets for S are {(H,ω1)}, {(L, ω1)}, {(H,ω2)}, {(L, ω2)}, while for R are
{(H,ω1), (L, ω1)}, {(H,ω2), (L, ω2)}.
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4 An Application
Let the sender be a firm, which is interested to sell a product to a consumer. The quality
of the good can be either high (H) or low (L). This is initially known by the firm, not by
the consumer. The firm can operate in one of two different markets (ω1 and ω2), which the
consumer fails to distinguish properly when he has to take into account firms’ behavior and
priors beliefs (i.e., the consumer puts them in the same analogy class). Prices are exogenously
given in the two markets (qω1 and qω2 , respectively), because of competition, technology, or
regulation. The firm has to choose the packaging of the product, or some other conspicuous
characteristic, between a more costly option (x, with cost cx) and a less costly one (y, with
cost cy). The consumer, after observing the packaging, and updating his belief on quality
based on the observed packaging but not on the market under consideration, has to choose
whether to exert effort (which has a cost of c) and acquire the knowledge of the actual quality
of the product (e.g., by carefully reading the product label and processing the information
in it) or abstain from it, relying on believed quality for his following decision.7 Indeed,
the consumer has then to choose whether to buy or not one unit of the product (a and a,
respectively).
The profit of the firm V (t, ω, z, a) is equal to qω−cz if a = a, and equal to 0 otherwise. We
note that the single crossing condition is violated. The utility of the consumer U(t, ω, z, a) is
equal to u(t, z)− qω if a = a, and equal to 0 otherwise. It is easy to check that the property
of increasing differences in actions and states is always satisfied in this example if qω1 6= qω2 .
In particular, it holds as stated in Section 3 for qω1 > qω2 , and with the reverse ordering, if
qω1 < qω2 .
7The interpretation provided here suggests that the cost to acquire information might differ depending
on ω, e.g., because mandatory labeling leads to more transparent information in one market than in the
other. This does not change the quality of our results, provided that the difference in the acquisition costs
is not too large.
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5 Results
We say that ordinary separation (reverse separation) occurs in ω ∈ {ω1, ω2} when the H-
type and the L-type of S, conditional on ω, choose signals x and y (y and x), respectively.
Similarly, we say that pooling on x (on y) occurs in ω ∈ {ω1, ω2} when both the H-type
and the L-type of S, conditional on ω, choose signal x (or y). When we say that separation
occurs, we mean that either ordinary or reverse separation occurs in at least one between ω1
and ω2.
state
ω1
0
0, a︷ ︸︸ ︷ 1︷ ︸︸ ︷ 0, a︷ ︸︸ ︷
1
β
state
ω2
0
0, a︷ ︸︸ ︷ 1︷ ︸︸ ︷ 0, a︷ ︸︸ ︷
1
β
β(ω, z)
Figure 1: Receiver’s optimal behavior as a function of beliefs β. We note that for certain beliefs,
e.g., β(ω, z) in the picture, the receiver’s optimal action changes between ω1 and ω2.
The graphical illustration in Figure 1 helps follow the proofs of all propositions. If the
cost c to acquire information about the sender’s type is positive but sufficiently low,8 then
the segment [0, 1] representing R’s belief can be divided into three intervals. When the belief
β is either close enough to 0, or close enough to 1, the expected benefit to acquire information
on t is not worth its (positive) cost, which means that R optimally chooses i = 0, and a = a
8More precisely, c must be lower than min
z
[U(L, ω, z, a)−U(L, ω, z, a)][U(H,ω, z, a)−U(H,ω, z, a)]
[U(L, ω, z, a)−U(L, ω, z, a)] + [U(H,ω, z, a)−U(H,ω, z, a)] .
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if β is low, or a = a if β is high. When instead β is in a mid-range, the expected benefit to
acquire information on t is worth its cost, so that R’s optimal choice is i = 1 (for this it is
necessary that c is not too large). For a given ω ∈ {ω1, ω2}, the threshold between the left
region and the central region in figure is denoted by βω,z01 , while the threshold between the
central region and the right region is denoted by βω,z10 , and their values can be computed as
follows:
βω,z01 =
c
U(H,ω, z, a)−U(H,ω, z, a) ;
βω,z10 = 1−
c
U(L, ω, z, a)−U(L, ω, z, a) .
Importantly, since R exhibits analogical reasoning, he forms the same belief in ω1 and ω2
when observing a signal, as indicated by the vertical dashed line which gives β(ω, z) for the
given the signal z ∈ {x, y}. At the same time, R can make different decisions in the two
states, which for the case of signal z are (0, a) in ω1 and 1 in ω2. This, together with the
assumption of increasing differences in actions and states, implies that the left and right
extrema of the interval where i = 1 is optimal are larger in ω1 than they are in ω2.
9 This
feature turns out to be pivotal for several of the following findings.
We are ready to state and prove all our results. Proposition 1 gives a necessary condition
for having reverse separation in ω2 in an equilibrium profile.
Proposition 1. When R exhibits analogical reasoning, if in equilibrium reverse separation
occurs in ω2, then ordinary separation must occur in ω1.
Proof. Consider a profile where reverse separation occurs in ω2. This means that, in ω2, the
L-type of S chooses x and the H-type of S chooses y. If both types find their choice optimal,
9If R cannot distinguish in which state he finds himself, then the extrema must necessarily coincide, since
R must take the same actions in ω1 and ω2. Also, if R can distinguish in which state he finds himself and
can exploit this information in updating beliefs, then the extrema can be different in ω1 and ω2 (as in the
case of analogical reasoning), but in addition R can form different beliefs in ω1 and ω2 when observing a
signal z.
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then R’s choice in ω2 must be: i = 0 and a = a when x is observed and i = 1 when y is
observed. Indeed, if the L-type of S finds optimal to choose x, which is more costly than
y, then R must respond in such a way that x pays more than y to the L-type. This only
happens when R chooses i = 0 and a = a when x is observed, and not when y is observed.
If this is the case, then the H-type of S prefers y over x only if R chooses i = 1 when y is
observed, otherwise the H-type would prefer x in order to induce R to switch to a = a.
If R finds optimal to choose i = 0 and a = a when x is observed in ω2, then the H-type
must be choosing x in ω1. Otherwise, signal x would fully reveal the L-type, and hence R’s
optimal choice would become i = 0 and a = a when x is observed. By the some token, if R
finds optimal to choose i = 1 when y is observed in ω2, then the L-type must be choosing y
in ω1. Therefore, ordinary separation must occur in ω1.
Proposition 2 provides a necessary condition for having ordinary separation in ω1 in an
equilibrium profile.
Proposition 2. When R exhibits analogical reasoning, if in equilibrium ordinary separation
occurs in ω1, then either reverse separation or pooling on x must occur in ω2.
Proof. Consider a profile where ordinary separation occurs in ω1. This means that the L-
type of S chooses y in ω1, and the H-type of S chooses x in ω1. If both types find their choice
optimal, then R’s choice in ω1 must be: i = 1 when x is observed, and i = 0 with a = a
when y is observed. Indeed, if the H-type of S finds optimal to choose x, which is more
costly than y, then R must respond in such a way that x pays more than y to the H-type.
This only happens when R chooses i = 0 and a = a when y is observed, and not when x is
observed. If this is the case, then the L-type of S prefers y over x only if R chooses i = 1
when x is observed, otherwise the L-type would prefer x in order to induce R to switch to
a = a.
If R finds optimal to choose i = 1 when x is observed in ω1, then the L-type must be
choosing x in ω2. Otherwise, signal x would fully reveal the H-type, and hence R’s optimal
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choice would become i = 0 and a = a when x is observed. If the L-type finds x optimal in
ω2, then R’s choice in ω2 must be: i = 0 and a = a when x is observed, and either (i) i = 0
and a = a or (ii) i = 1 when y is observed. Otherwise, the L-type of S would prefer y over
x because y is less costly and he would get a = a anyway. In case (i), the H-type and the
L-type both find optimal to choose x in ω2, so that pooling on x occurs. In case (ii), the
H-type finds optimal to choose y, while the L-type finds optimal to choose x, so that reverse
separation occurs in ω2.
Proposition 3 clarifies in which states ordinary and reverse separation can occur.
Proposition 3. When R exhibits analogical reasoning and c > 0, ordinary separation can
never occur in ω2, and reverse separation can never occur in ω1.
Proof. Consider first a profile where ordinary signaling occurs in ω2, i.e., the H-type of S
chooses x in ω2 and the L-type of S chooses y in ω2. If both types find their choice optimal,
then R’s choice in ω2 must be: i = 0 with a = a when y is observed, and i = 1 when x is
observed. Indeed, if the H-type of S finds optimal to choose x, which is more costly than
y, then R must respond in such a way that x pays more than y to the H-type. This only
happens when R chooses i = 0 and a = a when y is observed, and not when x is observed.
If this is the case, then the L-type of S prefers y over x only if R chooses i = 1 when x is
observed, otherwise the L-type would prefer x in order to induce R to switch to a = a.
If R finds optimal to choose i = 1 when x is observed in ω2, then the L-type must be
choosing x in ω1. Otherwise, signal x would fully reveal the H-type, and hence R’s optimal
choice would become i = 0 and a = a when x is observed. If the L-type finds optimal
to choose x in ω1, then R must be choosing i = 0 with a = a when x is observed in ω1,
otherwise the L-type would prefer the less costly signal y. However this is not possible, since
the assumption U(t, ω2, z, a) − U(t, ω2, z, a) > U(t, ω1, z, a) − U(t, ω1, z, a), for all t and z,
implies that if i = 1 is optimal for R when x is observed in ω2, then i = 1 is a fortiori optimal
for R when x is observed in ω1.
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Consider now a profile where reverse separation occurs in ω1, i.e., the H-type chooses y
in ω1 and the L-type chooses x in ω1. If both types find their choice optimal, then R’s choice
in ω1 must be: i = 1 when y is observed, and i = 0 with a = a when x is observed. Indeed, if
the L-type of S finds optimal to choose x, which is more costly than y, then R must respond
in such a way that x pays more than y to the L-type. This only happens when R chooses
i = 0 and a = a when x is observed, and not when y is observed. If this is the case, then
the H-type of S prefers y over x only if R chooses i = 1 when y is observed, otherwise the
H-type would prefer x in order to induce R to switch to a = a.
If R finds optimal to choose i = 0 with a = a when x is observed in ω1, then the H-type
must be choosing x in ω2. Otherwise, signal x would fully reveal the L-type, and hence
R’s optimal choice would become i = 0 and a = a when x is observed. If the H-type finds
optimal to choose x in ω2, then R must be choosing i = 0 with a = a when y is observed in
ω2, otherwise the H-type would prefer the less costly signal y. However this is not possible,
since the assumption U(t, ω2, z, a)−U(t, ω2, z, a) > U(t, ω1, z, a)−U(t, ω1, z, a), for all t and
z, implies that if i = 1 is optimal for R when y is observed in ω1, then either i = 1 or i = 0
with a = a is optimal for R when y is observed in ω2.
The next two propositions state that the only cases that have not been ruled out by Propo-
sitions 1-3 can actually occur in equilibrium.
Proposition 4. When R exhibits analogical reasoning, if c is positive but sufficiently low,
then there exist priors such that a profile where ordinary separation occurs in ω1 and reverse
separation occurs in ω2 is an equilibrium.
Proof. It is a matter of computation to verify that when
0<c<min
ω,z
[U(L, ω, z, a)−U(L, ω, z, a)][U(H,ω, z, a)−U(H,ω, z, a)]
[U(L, ω, z, a)−U(L, ω, z, a)] + [U(H,ω, z, a)−U(H,ω, z, a)] ,
there exist, for ω ∈ {ω1, ω2} and z ∈ {x, y}, threshold numbers βω,z01 , βω,z10 ≥ 0, with βω,z01 <
βω,z10 , such that R’s optimal behavior is partitioned on the belief space as follows: i = 0 with
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a = a when his belief belongs to (0, βω,z01 ), i = 1 when his beliefs belongs to (β
ω,z
01 , β
ω,z
10 ), and
i = 0 with a = a when his belief belongs to (βω,z10 , 1). Moreover, note that β
ω1,z
01 > β
ω2,z
01
and βω1,z10 > β
ω2,z
10 for z ∈ {x, y}, due to the assumption that U(t, ω2, z, a) − U(t, ω2, z, a) >
U(t, ω1, z, a)− U(t, ω1, z, a) for all t and z.
Therefore, if βω2,y01 < β(ω1, y) = β(ω2, y) < min{βω1,y01 , βω2,y01 } and max{βω2,x10 , βω1,x10 } <
β(ω1, x) = β(ω2, x) < β
ω1,x
10 , then R optimally chooses as follows: in ω1, i = 0 with a = a
when y is observed and i = 1 when x is observed; in ω2, i = 1 when y is observed and i = 0
with a = a when x is observed. Given this behavior by R, it is optimal for the L-type of S
to choose y in ω1 and x in ω2, while for the H-type of S it is optimal to choose x in ω1 and
y in ω2. Finally, note that, when S behaves in such a way, the Bayes’ rule for R, taken into
account that R is an analogical reasoner, implies that:
β(ω1, x) = β(ω2, x) =
pω1p(H|ω1)
pω1p(H|ω1) + (1− pω1)(1− p(H|ω2)
; (1)
β(ω1, y) = β(ω2, y) =
(1− pω1)p(H|ω2)
pω1(1− p(H|ω1)) + (1− pω1)p(H|ω2)
. (2)
To complete the proof, it is enough to note that priors pω1 , p(H|ω1) and p(H|ω2) can be chosen
to have indeed βω2,y01 < β(ω1, y) = β(ω2, y) < min{βω1,y01 , βω2,y01 } and max{βω2,x10 , βω1,x10 } <
β(ω1, x) = β(ω2, x) < β
ω1,x
10 .
Proposition 5. When R exhibits analogical reasoning, if c is positive but sufficiently low,
then there exist priors such that a profile where ordinary separation occurs in ω1 and pooling
on x occurs in ω2 is an equilibrium.
Proof. The statement can be proven by adjusting the proof of Proposition 4. In particular,
consider the case where β(ω1, x) = β(ω2, x) < β
ω2,x
01 and max{βω2,x10 , βω1,x10 } < β(ω1, x) =
β(ω2, x) < β
ω1,x
10 , so that R’s choice is: in ω1, i = 0 with a = a when y is observed and
i = 1 when x is observed; in ω2, i = 0 with a = a when y is observed and i = 0 with
a = a when x is observed. Given this behavior by R, the L-type of S finds optimal to
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state
ω1 0
0, a︷ ︸︸ ︷ 1︷ ︸︸ ︷ 0, a︷ ︸︸ ︷
1
β
β(ω, y)
state
ω2 0
0, a︷ ︸︸ ︷ 1︷ ︸︸ ︷ 0, a︷ ︸︸ ︷
1
β
signal y
0
0, a︷ ︸︸ ︷ 1︷ ︸︸ ︷ 0, a︷ ︸︸ ︷
1
β
0
0, a︷ ︸︸ ︷ 1︷ ︸︸ ︷ 0, a︷ ︸︸ ︷
1
β
β(ω, x)
signal x
Figure 2: Receiver’s behavior that is optimal and sustains a profile where ordinary separation takes
place in ω1 and reverse separation takes place in ω2.
choose y in ω1 and x in ω2, while the H-type of S finds optimal to choose x in ω1 and x
in ω2. As in the proof of Proposition 4, to complete the proof it is enough to note that
priors pω1 , p(H|ω1) and p(H|ω2) can be chosen to have indeed β(ω1, x) = β(ω2, x) < β
ω2,x
01 and
max{βω2,x10 , βω1,x10 } < β(ω1, x) = β(ω2, x) < βω1,x10 .
Considered together, Propositions 1-5 imply that only two patterns of separation are possible
in equilibrium: either ordinary separation in ω1 and reverse separation in ω2, or ordinary
separation in ω1 and pooling on x in ω2. Figure 2 and Figure 3 provide examples where
acquisition costs and priors are such that the separation patterns considered in, respectively,
Proposition 4 and Proposition 5 can actually be sustained in equilibrium.
6 Discussion
The possible outcomes of signaling to a receiver who reasons analogically over two states
and who can acquire information at a cost can be, as in the standard model, separation or
pooling.10 Separation can take place even if the single crossing condition does not hold and
10This paper focuses on separation, but is straightforward to see that pooling in both states can occur in
equilibrium.
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state
ω1 0
0, a︷ ︸︸ ︷ 1︷ ︸︸ ︷ 0, a︷ ︸︸ ︷
1
β
β(ω, y)
state
ω2 0
0, a︷ ︸︸ ︷ 1︷ ︸︸ ︷ 0, a︷ ︸︸ ︷
1
β
signal y
0
0, a︷ ︸︸ ︷ 1︷ ︸︸ ︷ 0, a︷ ︸︸ ︷
1
β
0
0, a︷ ︸︸ ︷ 1︷ ︸︸ ︷ 0, a︷ ︸︸ ︷
1
β
β(ω, x)
signal x
Figure 3: Receiver’s behavior that is optimal and sustains a profile where ordinary separation takes
place in ω1 and pooling on x takes place in ω2.
can be ordinary or reverse. Some combinations of separation and pooling are possible, but
not all of them. Table 1 summarizes the feasible equilibrium outcomes.
Are analogical reasoning and costly acquisition of information necessary for these re-
sults?11 It turns out that abandoning either of the two assumptions leads to the impossibility
of a separation outcome.
No kind of separation is possible if we assume that the receiver is not an analogical
reasoner but either cannot distinguish at all state 1 from state 2, or is perfectly aware of the
state and updates beliefs according to Bayes’ rule. In any state where separation occurs,
R learns all relevant information if he is perfectly aware of the state, so he never acquires
information, making a deviation by L profitable. If, instead, R cannot distinguish at all
between states, separation requires that R does not choose a upon seeing y while acquiring
information upon seeing x; but if R acquires information upon seeing x, L never sends x, so
x separates perfectly H from L, making information acquisition worthless.
No kind of separation is possible even if we maintain analogical reasoning, but we make
11 If the sender is forced to hold the same beliefs in the two states, and sends the same signals, separation
is impossible: signals would be fully revealing, hence the receiver would acquire no information, making a
deviation by L profitable.
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state 2
ordinary
separation
reverse
separation pooling
state 1
ordinary
separation
reverse
separation
pooling
Table 1: Check marks denote combinations of outcomes that are feasibile in equilibrium.
costly acquisition ineffective, by either assuming that R always acquires information, or R
never acquires information. In both cases all sender’s types want to send the same signal
(the least costly that grants a, or if it does not exist just the least costly).
Lastly, even if we did not compare welfare across equilibria, it may be worth remarking
that beyond the standard trade-off (between the cost of the signal and the value of the
information transmitted) in our setting there is the additional cost of acquiring informa-
tion (which is necessary to sustain separation). This diminishes the relative desirability of
separation whenever pooling is attained without costly acquisition.
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